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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. Nature of the Case 
This is an appeal of the District Court's orders dismissing all counts set forth in the 
Appellants' Complaint and Amended Complaint. The Respondent A&B Irrigation District 
("Respondent" or "District") submits the District Court properly dismissed the case and 
respectfully requests this Court to affirm. 
II. Course of Proceedings 
The Appellants filed their initial Complaint on February 12, 2016 seeking a declaratory 
judgment based upon various constitutional theories. Clerk's Record ("R.") 7. The Respondent 
filed a motion to dismiss and supporting materials on April 4, 2016. R. 35-242. The Appellants 
responded and also filed a motion to strike, a motion to continue the proceedings, and an 
Amended Complaint adding a "breach of fiduciary duty" claim (Count III). R.263-301. After 
further filings and oral argument, the District Court issued a decision dismissing Counts I and II 
of the Amended Complaint. 1 R. 369. The Appellants requested reconsideration and the 
Respondent filed a motion to dismiss Count III. R. 393, 366. After oral argument on these 
motions the District Court issued a second decision dismissing Count III and denying the 
Appellants' motion to reconsider. R. 612. The court then entered a final judgment for the 
Respondent. R. 626. 
1 Count III was not part of the Respondent's initial motion to dismiss as the Appellants failed to include the claim in 
their original complaint. 
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Finally, the court entered an amended judgment for and awarded costs as a matter of right 
to the Respondent. R. 644-45. The present appeal followed. 
III. Statement of Facts 
The Respondent, A&B Irrigation District, deiivers surface and groundwater to about 650 
landowners for the irrigation of approximately 82,000 acres in Jerome and Minidoka Counties. 
R. 378. The natural flow surface water rights and groundwater rights are appurtenant to the 
entire District under its "digital boundary" place of use. 2 R. 150, 4 7 4 ( describing same "Large 
POU info" and referencing the District's digital boundary); see also, I.C. §§ 42-219; 42-
I411(2)(h). The District also holds storage water rights totaling about 137,000 acre-feet in 
American Falls and Palisades Reservoirs. 3 R. 63. The storage water is appurtenant to and can be 
used on any lands within the District's place of use, or digital boundary. See id. All landowners 
within the District pay the same assessment, including contract costs for the storage space and 
operation and maintenance of the reservoirs. R. 63-64. 
Over time the A&B Irrigation District experienced declining groundwater levels and 
supplies resulting in a delivery call and extensive litigation regarding its senior groundwater 
right. See generally,A&B Irr. Dist. v. lDWR, 153 Idaho 500 (2012); see also, Rangen, Inc. v. 
IDWR, 159 Idaho 798, 802 (2016) ("From October 1980 through September 2008, average 
2 However, each natural flow or groundwater right is limited to a total number of irrigated acres within the place of 
use, or digital boundary. The storage water rights are not limited in that manner. 
3 The Appellants erroneously allege the District "has not acquired any additional water rights, but instead intends to 
use the same, already-existing surface water rights ... to irrigate both Unit A and these 1,500 additional acres." See 
Appellants ' Brief ("App. Br.") at 5. A&B acquired a new natural flow water right permit in 2015 as part of the Plant 
#2 Project. R. 62 (water right no. 01-10633). The District can also use its existing storage water rights to irrigate 
any lands with the district boundary. R. 63, 168. 
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annual discharge from the ESPA exceeded average annual recharge by 270,000 acre-feet, which 
resulted in declining aquifer levels and declining discharge to the Snake River and tributary 
springs"). In addition, the District participated in a surface water delivery call to protect its 
senior surface water rights through the Surface Watt:r Coalition. See generaiiy, A&B Irr. Dist. v. 
Spackman, 155 Idaho 640 (2013).4 
The District addressed certain groundwater supply problems in the early 1990s by 
converting some lands historically irrigated with groundwater to a surface water supply. R. 65. 
Despite this project the District suffered continued groundwater declines as well as increased 
demands on its surface water distribution system, limiting its delivery capacity. See id. 
In response, the District proposed to develop the Unit A Pumping Plant #2 and Pipeline 
project. R. 65. The project consists of a second pumping plant on the Snake River and over 19 
miles of pipeline in the western portion of the irrigation district, allowing delivery of surface 
water to approximately 4,000 to 6,000 existing irrigated acres within the District boundaries. R. 
3 7 I. Fallowing completion of the project, all Unit A landowners would receive an increase in 
delivery rate from 0.75 to 1 miner's inch per acre (a 33% increase). 5 R. 66, 68. The second 
4 Although the District delivers both surface and groundwater to its landowners, it is not "unlike any other irrigation 
district in Idaho" as claimed by the Appellants. See App. Br. at 24. For example, Falls Irrigation District near 
American Falls, Fremont-Irrigation District near Rexburg, and Southwest Irrigation District near Burley, all use both 
surface and groundwater on their respective irrigation projects. 
5 When the landowners' irrigation demands exceed the delivery capacity ofa particular well system or surface water 
canal, the District goes "on allotment", which means the available water is delivered pro rata according to the 
number ofacres served. R. 64-65. This delivery period typically occurs during the peak of the irrigation season 
when crops need water and the temperature is at its highest. R. 64. 
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pumping plant increases delivery capacity for all landowners that receive surface water, 
including the Appellants. See id. 
Following the statutory procedure set forth in Idaho Code§ 43-401 et seq. the District 
held a special election to authorize a loan to help finance the project. R. 3 7 i . The eiection 
passed and thereafter the Board of Directors held a hearing to apportion the benefits and assess 
the costs of the loan. See id. None of the Appellants objected to the Board's decision. 6 R. 66. 
Following the apportionment hearing, the Respondent filed a petition with the Minidoka 
County District Court to confirm the special election and statutory proceedings. R. 371. 
Appellants Daniel Paslay and Gary Ottman filed a response opposing the Respondent's requests. 
R. 66. The Minidoka County District Court denied the Appellants' response and granted the 
Respondent's requested relief for judicial confirmation. R. 227-232. No party, including any of 
the Appellants, appealed the court's final judgment. R. 3 7 l . 
Combined, the three Appellants irrigate about 610 acres of land within the A&B 
Irrigation District. R. 8-9, 370. The Appellants receive surface water from the District. R. 9. 
Appellants admitted they were not deprived of any water during the course of this case. R. 514. 
("Plaintiffs have not already been deprived their constitutionally-protected interests in 
property"). The District Court confirmed this fact, noting that the Appellants did not claim "they 
have been deprived of their entitlement to irrigation water in the quantity they are entitled to 
receive." R. 379 (emphasis in original). The District's manager also testified that the Appellants 
6 Although a representative of Appellant Tateoka Brothers, LLC attended the hearing, he did not present any 
testimony or evidence in opposition to the Board's decision. R. 66. 
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were receiving full deliveries upon request during the 2016 irrigation, and that as a result of the 
Plant #2 Project, their "allotment" delivery would increase from 0.75 to 1 miner's inch/acre. R. 
68,538. 
In sum, implementation of the Plant #2 Project actuaiiy increased, not decreased, water 
deliveries to the Appellants. The District did not "take" any of Appellants' property rights. 
Furthermore, the District's actions did not violate any constitutional or trust obligations and the 
loan assessment was levied and judicially confirmed pursuant to Idaho law. The District Court 
rightly dismissed the case and this Court should affirm. 
ADDITIONAL ISSUES ON APPEAL 
1. Whether the Court should enter an award of attorneys' fees to Respondent 
pursuant to Idaho Code§§ 12-117 and/or 12-121? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
I. Motions to Dismiss under I.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) & 56 
In a motion to dismiss "[t]he question then is whether the non-movant has alleged 
sufficient facts in support of his claim which, if true, would entitle him to relief." Rincover v. 
Department of Fin., Sec. Bureau, 128 Idaho 653, 656 (1996) (regarding 12(b )(6) motions); Serv. 
Emp. Intern. v. Idaho Dep't of H. & W., 106 Idaho 756, 758 (1984) (regarding 12(b) challenges 
generally). 
Typically with a motion to dismiss, a court looks only at the pleadings, and all inferences 
are viewed in favor of the non-moving party. Young v. City of Ketchum, 137 Idaho 102, 104 
(2002) (regarding 12(b )( 6) motions). However, when a court considers matters outside the 
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pleadings under Rule 12(b)(6), it must apply the Rule 56 summary judgment standard. See 
I.R.C.P. 12(b). See Syringa Networks, LLC v. Idaho Dep't of Admin., 159 Idaho 813,823 (2016) 
(citingMcCann v. McCann, 152 Idaho 809,814 (2012)); see also, Stewartv. Arrington Constr. 
Co., 92 Idaho 526,531 (1968). The "use and effect of the summary judgment procedure is much 
like that of the pretrial conference. It helps to separate the real issues and facts from the spurious 
ones; to eliminate the chaff from the wheat. If all the claims or defenses are all chaff, they are all 
eliminated completely." 92 Idaho at 531. This procedural practice in Idaho is common and 
well-established. 7 
Summary judgment is appropriate ifthere are no genuine issues of material fact and the 
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See I.R.C.P. 56(a); City of Pocatello v. 
State of Idaho (In re SRBA), 145 Idaho 497, 500 (2008). "It is axiomatic that upon a motion for 
summary judgment the non-moving party may not rely upon its pleadings, but must come 
forward with evidence by way of affidavit or otherwise which contradicts the evidence submitted 
by the moving party, and which establishes the existence of a material issue of disputed fact." 
Jones v. HealthSouth Treasure Valley Hosp., 147 Idaho 109, 112 (2009). The nonmoving party 
must submit more than just conclusory assertions that an issue of material fact exists to withstand 
summary judgment. See Van v. Portneuf Med. Ctr., 147 Idaho 552,556 (2009). "A mere 
scintilla of evidence or only slight doubt as to the facts is not sufficient to create a genuine issue 
7 The Appellants take issue with the civil rules' summary judgment procedure but can point to no case or statute that 
prohibits its application in this case. See App. Br. at 7-8. Contrary to Appellants' claim, civil litigation does not 
always require an answer and extensive discovery before a judgment is rendered. When facts are undisputed and 
there is no case or controversy, such as in this matter, expensive and protracted litigation is unnecessary. The 
District Court properly applied the summary judgment standard in dismissing Appellants' case as a matter of law. 
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of material fact for the purposes of summary judgment." Id. Further, "if the nonmoving party 
fails to provide a sufficient showing to establish the essential elements of his or her case, 
judgment shall be granted to the moving party." Porter v. Bassett, 146 Idaho 399,403 (2008). 
Finally, justiciability questions like "standing" can be addressed through a motion to 
dismiss, including a Rule 12(b )( 6) motion analyzed under the summary judgment standard. See 
Coalition for Agri. 's Future v. Canyon County, 160 Idaho 142, 145 (2016). If a party does not 
have standing its case may be dismissed as a matter of law. 160 Idaho at 148. 
II. Motions to Strike & Continue Proceedings 
The admissibility of evidence and the decision to grant or deny a motion to strike are 
matters of discretion with the trial court. See I.R.C.P. 12( d) 8; Shea v. Kevic Corp., 156 Idaho 
540, 544 (2014 ). A trial court has broad discretion in the admission of evidence and its judgment 
will only be reversed when there has been a clear abuse of discretion. See Baker v. Shavers, Inc., 
117 Idaho 696, 698 (1990). 
The decision to continue proceedings to allow for additional discovery in response to a 
motion for summary judgment under former Rule 56(f) is similarly committed to the trial court's 
discretion. See Jenkins v. Boise Cascade Corp., 141 Idaho 233,239 (2005). A trial court does 
not abuse its discretion if it: (1) correctly perceives the issue as discretionary, (2) acts within the 
bounds of discretion and applies the correct legal standards, and (3) reaches the decision through 
an exercise of reason. See id. 
8 The Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure were amended effective July I, 2016. Rule 56(d) now covers what was 
included in former Rule 56(f). 
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"Summary judgment proceedings are decided on the basis of admissible evidence." 
Campbell v. Kvamme, 155 Idaho 692,696 (2013). As such, "[t]he admissibility of evidence 
contained in affidavits and depositions in support of or in opposition to a motion for summary 
judgment is a threshold matter before applying the liberal construction and reasonabie inferences 
rule to determine whether the evidence creates a genuine issue of material fact for trial." See 
Fragnella v. Petrovich, 153 Idaho 266,271 (2012). 
The District Court properly recognized and applied the above standards of review in 
granting Respondent's motions and denying Appellants' motions. This Court should affirm. 
ARGUMENT 
The Appellants' arguments center on procedure and the unsubstantiated claim that the 
Respondent's actions "will cause" the amount of water available to them "to decrease" at some 
point in the future. See App. Br. at 15. As rightly noted by the District Court, these claims are 
premature and hypothetical. Notably, the Appellants have not been deprived of any water, which 
they do not dispute. See id at 15-16 ("Landowners have not already been deprived of their 
property"). Just the opposite, implementing the Plant #2 project actually increased the rate of 
water delivery to their farms on an instantaneous basis, which will benefit their agricultural 
operations. Further, the Appellants have not shown they have lost their "annual" use of water for 
irrigation purposes, or that they did not receive water consistent with the District's water rights, 
contract with the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, and District by-laws (identifying three (3) acre-
feet per acre as the minimum volume delivery with an excess charge schedule above that 
amount). R. 145. 
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While the A&B Irrigation District carefully undertook an important water delivery 
project to the benefit of all District landowners, the Appellants mischaracterize the facts and 
continue to make unsupported constitutional claims to justify their appeal. The Court should 
reject these arguments and affirm the District Court's decisions accordingly. 
First, the Appellants base their Count I claim on the mistaken premise that the Plant #2 
Project "will cause the amount of water available to Unit A to decrease" and that they will be 
deprived of water without consent. See App. Br. at 23. The District Court saw through this 
speculative claim and properly found there was no justiciable controversy without the actual 
deprivation of water. Further, the Appellants' misinterpretation of the Idaho Constitution was 
properly dismissed as a matter of law. See IDAHO CONST. Art. XV,§ 4 (no deprivation of the 
"annual" use of water "needed ... to irrigate the land"). 
Second, the Appellants' Count II claim is based on the mistaken theory that the loan 
election and subsequent judicial confirmation proceeding is not binding on them. The fact that 
the Appellants disagree with the election results and oppose paying assessments that were 
properly apportioned to their properties, like all other District lands, does not mean they have 
been deprived of a constitutional right without due process. To the contrary, the Respondent 
followed the statutory election and apportionment procedures which were then judicially 
confirmed. The Appellants had the opportunity to vote in the election, participate in the 
apportionment hearing before the Board of Directors, and appear in the judicial confirmation 
case. The fact the court did not consider their constitutional claims and their failure to appeal 
that decision is binding now. Moreover, the fact the Appellants voluntarily paid the District's 
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annual operation and maintenance assessment does not constitute an unconstitutional "taking" of 
their property (i.e. money). 
Lastly, the District has not breached any fiduciary duties owed to the Appellants. The 
District Court correctly found that the Appellants "are in fact receiving the water that they are 
entitled to receive presently and [they] do not dispute this fact." 9 R. 621. The Appellants' 
request to enjoin the use of the Project was properly rejected as the Court noted "the Project is 
not presently causing or threatening any actual irreparable harm to the [Appellants]." Simply 
stated, a speculative claim about "diluting" a future water supply does not mean the District 
breached any fiduciary duty owed to the Appellants. 
In sum, the District Court properly dismissed the Appellants' case on standing and res 
judicata grounds. This Court should affirm. 
I. The District Court and this Court Have the Express Authority to Address 
Justiciability of a Case. 
The Appellants initially complain that the ')usticiability" of their case was not properly 
before the District Court since the Respondent's motions to dismiss were filed under Rule 
12(b)(6), not Rule 12(b)(l). See App. Br. at 9. By not citing Rule 12(b)(l), the Appellants claim 
the Respondent's motions run afoul of Rule 7(b)(l). This "form over substance" argument fails 
to recognize that any Idaho court can address justiciability, or subject matter jurisdiction, at any 
9 The Appellants, like any other landowner in the district, are entitled to receive three (3) acre-feet per acre pursuant 
to the District's water rights, contract with Reclamation, and the adopted by-laws. R. 64. A landowner can receive 
more than 3 acre-feet provided the water is beneficially used and he or she pays the "excess" water charge. The 
"excess" water use fee schedule is also defined by the contract, the District by-laws, and the annual assessment 
resolution. R. 64, 145, 185. 
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time. 10 Moreover, nothing prohibits a trial court from raising and addressing such issues sua 
sponte, without a formal motion by an opposing party. 11 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 12(h)(3) expressly provides that "[i]fthe court determines 
at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action."12 The 
civil rules apply to the District Court in this matter. Therefore, the Appellants' argument fails 
under the rule's plain language. Moreover, the Idaho Supreme Court has held that "an inherent 
duty of any court is to inquire into the underlying interest at stake in a legal proceeding." Martin 
v. Miller, 93 Idaho 924, 926 (1970) (emphasis added); see also, State v. Urabazzo, 150 Idaho 
158, 163 (2010), overruled on other grounds, Verska v. St. Alphonsus Reg'! Med Ctr., 151 Idaho 
889 (2011) ("a court has a sua sponte duty to ensure it has subject matter jurisdiction over a 
case"); see also, Bowles v. Pro Indiviso, Inc., 132 Idaho 371,375 (1999). 
Finally, the Idaho Supreme Court recently affirmed dismissal of case on standing grounds 
pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). See Coalitionfor Agri's Future, 160 Idaho at 148. In other words, 
contrary to the Appellants' theory, this Court has not held that a trial court can only address 
questions of standing pursuant to a Rule 12(b)(l) motion. 
Based upon I.R.C.P. 12(h)(3) and the precedent identified above, the Court should reject 
Appellants' argument thatjusticiability was not properly raised before the District Court. See 
10 The Appellants argued below that only this Court, not trial courts, can review subject matter jurisdiction and 
standing sua sponte. See R. 412. The plain language of Rule 12(h)(3) defeats this argument. 
11 The Respondent did identify the lack of a justiciable "case or controversy" in its response to the Appellants' initial 
motion to strike and continue the proceedings. R.331-35. 
12 The citation is to the rule as reformatted and effective July 1, 2016 by order of the Idaho Supreme Court. See In 
re: Adoption of Newly Formatted Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure (March 1, 2016). 
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App. Br. at I 0. The Respondent respectfully requests the Court to affirm the District Court's 
dismissal. 
II. Since Appellants Lacked Standing, the District Court Properly Dismissed Counts I 
and III as a Matter of Law. 
A. Count I was properly dismissed. 
The District Court held that "absent a showing of an actual deprivation of water ... there 
is no justiciable controversy and that allegations of the plaintiffs' Complaint are not ripe for 
judicial review and the plaintiffs lack standing to assert such a claim at this time." R. 380-81. 
The court's ruling is correct and should be affirmed. 
The Appellants claim that Count I is ripe for adjudication on the theory that they "have 
not consented to any decrease in the amount of water provided to the [Landowners' p]roperties." 
App. Br. at 15. Despite no injury, the Appellants argue that the Respondent is "infringing on 
Landowners' rights to the water dedicated to their land." Id. However, the Appellants admit that 
they "never claim that A&B has already denied them water." Id. The lack of a cognizable injury 
is precisely the reason the District Court dismissed the claim. Indeed, this Court has held that 
such abstract questions are not justiciable under Idaho's declaratory judgment statute. 13 See 
Wylie v. State, Idaho Transp. Bd., 151 Idaho 26, 31 (2011) ("courts will not rule on declaratory 
13 Contrary to Appellants' theories, the fact they filed a declaratory judgment action does not relieve them from 
establishing standing to pursue a justiciable claim in the first place. See Coalition/or Agri. 's Future, 160 at 147 
("The Coalition argues at length that because it is seeking declaratory relief, the standing requirements are relaxed. 
'However, the Declaratory Judgment Act does not relieve a party from showing that it has standing to bring the 
action in the first instance."'). 
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judgment actions which present questions that are moot or abstract"); see also, Harris v. Cassia 
County, 106 Idaho 513 (1984). 
Moreover, the Idaho Supreme Court recently explained the fundamental tenet of standing 
as follows: 
"It is a fundamental tenet of American Jurisprudence that a person wishing to 
invoke a court's jurisdiction must have standing." Van Valkenburgh v. Citzens 
for Term Limits, 135 Idaho 121, 124, 15 P.3d 1129, 1132 (2000). In order to 
satisfy the requirement of standing, a petitioner must "allege or demonstrate an 
injury in fact and a substantial likelihood that the judicial relief requested will 
prevent or redress the claimed injury." Miles, 116 Idaho at 641, 778 P.2d at 
763. Standing requires a showing of a distinct palpable injury and fairly 
traceable causal connection between the claimed injury and the challenged 
conduct. State v. Philip Morris, Inc., 158 Idaho 874,881,354 P.3d 187, 194 
(2015). "This Court has defined palpable injury as an injury that is easily 
perceptible, manifest, or readily visible." Id. 
Coalition for Agri. 's Future,160 Idaho at 146. 
Here the Appellants cannot show a "distinct palpable injury." Instead, they only 
repeatedly allege that the "Project, as presently constituted, will cause the amount of water 
available to [Landowners], and other Unit A members, to decrease." App. Br. at 15-16. They 
base this assertion on the erroneous assumption that delivering surface water to other acres 
through the Plant #2 Project will result in decreased water supplies in the future. See id. at 17, 
32, 38, n. 11. The Appellants have no basis for such assertions. 
Contrary to the Appellants' theory, water supplies can vary year to year. See AFRD #2 v. 
IDWR, 143 Idaho 862, 878 (2007) ("Obviously, the quantity of water available at the end of the 
irrigation season is dependent upon a number of factors like the irrigators' needs during the 
season, reservoir capacity and amount of water in the reservoir at the beginning of the season"). 
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The A&B Irrigation District may receive natural flow, including under its new permit no. 01-
10633, as well as storage under its American Falls and Palisades storage rights. Delivering 
surface water to certain acres formerly irrigated with groundwater does not mean the District's 
storage rights \Von't fill again the following year. In years of high snowpack and precipitation, 
like that witnessed this year, it's reasonably certain that the District's storage will completely fill 
prior to the irrigation season. 14 Notably, as of March Pt, the NRCS SNOTEL sites in the Upper 
Snake River Basin above Palisades and American Falls measured snow water equivalents of 
162% and 151% (compared to the 30-year median). 15 
The efficient and beneficial use of the District's storage water under such conditions does 
not "take" water away from the Appellants. Instead, it ensures the District uses water 
beneficially as required by Idaho law. See AFRD #2, 143 Idaho at 880 ("Neither the Idaho 
Constitution, nor statutes, permit irrigation districts and individual water right holders to waste 
water or unnecessarily hoard it without putting it to some beneficial use"). Moreover, and more 
importantly, the efficient use of storage ensures water delivery to all landowners on the A&B 
14 Even if the District's storage does not completely fill the following year does not mean that the District would not 
have sufficient water to deliver to its landowners, including the Appellants. Mr. Temple explained that the District 
has diverted on average (over the last IO years) about 57,000 acre-feet of surface water through a combination of 
natural flow and storage water rights. R. 68. The Plant #2 Project is expected to deliver an additional 4,500 acre-
feet to District lands. See id Accordingly, even if the District did not receive any new storage, it would still have 
sufficient supplies to deliver water for at least two irrigation seasons (i.e. 137,000 / 2 = 68,500 at). The bottom line 
is that Appellants cannot definitively show at this time that they will receive less water in the future as a result of the 
Plant #2 Project's operation in 2016. 
15 See https://wcc.sc.egov.usda.gov/reports/UpdateReport.html?report=Idaho (site visited March 1, 2017). Of course 
conditions can and will continually change throughout the season, and that is the point. 
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project which directly benefits the Appellants. 16 The Idaho Supreme confirmed this principle 
applicable to irrigation districts over a century ago: 
The benefit of the water supplied to the owners of land within the district ... 
means such benefits as contribute to promote the prosperity of the district, and 
add value to the pmperty of the respective owners of the entire district, and such 
improvement of land in any portion of the district adds to and increases the value 
of the lands of the entire district as the water is applied and devoted to beneficial 
use by the owners through said system. 
See Colburn v. Wilson, 24 Idaho 94, 103 (1913). 
The Idaho Supreme Court later reaffirmed the above principle in Nelson v. Big Lost Irr. 
Dist., 148 Idaho 157, 163-64 (2009). Despite the benefit to the entire irrigation project, the 
Appellants argue their standing is sufficient based upon "threatened harm" rather than past 
injury. App. Br. at 18. They go so far to claim that "but for the Project, [surface water that] 
would have been delivered to Landowners is instead being depleted and used to water lands that 
have never before been irrigated by surface water." Id at 19. Again, the Appellants' argument 
is speculative and based upon flawed premises. 
First, the Appellants admit they have not been deprived of any water. See App. Br. at 15. 
The District's manager Dan Temple confirmed that Appellants were all receiving water on their 
lands and that they would continue to receive water upon request for the rest of the 2016 
irrigation season. R. 538. Mr. Temple further explained that all landowners, not just the 
Appellants, pay assessments for the storage water and that based upon then current water 
16 The Appellants' arguments seemingly ignore the remaining 647 landowners on the A&B project and their need 
for water. Tellingly, no other landowner is challenging the District's Plant #2 Project or alleging it results in an 
unlawful "taking" of water. 
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supplies, operation of the Plant #2 Project would not deprive the Appellants of any water needed 
to irrigate their lands in 2016. R. 63-64, 68. Moreover, completion of the Plant #2 Project 
allowed the District to deliver Appellants water at a higher instantaneous delivery rate. R. 68. 
Instead of receiving 0.75 miner's inch/per acre, the Appeilants were expected to receive at least I 
miner's inch/per acre, a 33% increase. See id. Receiving water at a higher delivery rate during 
the peak of the irrigation season will benefit, not harm, the Appellants' farming operations. 
These undisputed facts not only defeat Appellants' standing, they also defeat the merits 
of their constitutional claim. 17 See IDAHO CONST. Art XV, § 4 (shall not "be deprived of the 
annual use of the same, when needed for domestic purposes, or to irrigate land so settled upon 
or improved ... ") ( emphasis added). Plaintiffs admittedly could not show they were being 
deprived of the annual use of water they could put to beneficial use during the 2016 irrigation 
season. Instead, it is undisputed they received full water delivery upon request. R. 538. 
Accordingly, there was no "imminent" harm to Appellants or "infringement" on any 
constitutional rights. 
Although water rights are protectable private property rights in Idaho, the Respondent 
violated no constitutional rights by delivering water to other landowners on the project. 18 Again, 
the storage water is appurtenant to and can be used on any lands within the District boundaries. 
17 However, since the Appellants lacked standing it is not necessary to address their constitutional arguments. See 
State v. Lee, 153 Idaho 559, 563 (2012) ("the Court will not address constitutional issues when a case can be decided 
upon other grounds"). 
18 Appellants claim they have an enforceable constitutional right despite no water shortage or injury. Holding a 
constitutional right does not give a person legal standing to file a lawsuit when that right is not harmed. 
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R. 63. The SRBA partial decrees and IDWR's Director confirm this fact in regards to storage 
water used on the A&B Irrigation District project. R. 63, 157-62, 168. It is speculative to claim 
that the District would "harm" the Appellants in a time of water shortage and deprive them of 
any \Vater. :Moreover, the Appellants do not hold an "unquaiified" right to any amount of water 
contrary to the District's water rights, contract with Reclamation, and its by-laws. R. 62-65. 
This Court expressly recognized the same in Nelson: 
The District is the appropriator of the water. The Directors have the power "to 
establish equitable by-laws, rules and regulations for the distribution and use of 
water among the owners of such land [ within the District], as may be necessary 
and just to secure the just and proper distribution of the same." 
148 Idaho at 163 (citing LC.§ 43-304). 19 
The District Court rightly acknowledged that "speculative harm" is not justiciable or ripe 
for adjudication similar to the facts in Coalition for Agri. 's Futurem supra, and ABC Agra, LLC 
v. Critical Access Group, Inc., 156 Idaho 781 (2014). R. 377, 380-81, 614. On appeal the 
Appellants ignore these cases and argue their situation is more analogous to Schneider v. Howe, 
142 Idaho 767 (2006), and Boundary Backpackers v. Boundary Cnty., 128 Idaho 371 (1996). 
Contrary the Appellants' arguments, the cases they rely upon are distinguishable and do not 
excuse their lack of legal standing. 
First, Appellants claim the court will be in no better position to determine the matter like 
the easement issue in Schneider. See App. Br. at 16. To the contrary, in Schneider the plaintiff 
19 The Appellants erroneously argue that Nelson only applies "in the context of assessing costs and has never been 
applied by this Court to water distribution." App. Br. at 25-26. To the contrary, the issue in Nelson directly 
addressed water distribution and the irrigation district's rule to allocate conveyance loss on a pro rata basis to all 
landowners. 148 Idaho at 158. The District Court properly relied upon this precedent. R. 379-80. 
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sought a declaration of a public easement to confirm the right for purposes of subdividing his 
property. See 142 Idaho at 773. The defendant had constructed a garage within the easement 
and refused to let the plaintiff use the easement. See id. at 770. The Idaho Supreme Court found 
that delaying the case "would add nothing material to the litigation" and faiiing to address it 
might prevent the county from approving the plaintiffs subdivision. Id. at 773. The plaintiff 
was clearly harmed by the physical obstruction in the public easement. 
Here, on the other hand, the Appellants can point to no "perceptible" injury or "manifest" 
future harm that will result from the District's actions. Unlike the garage and its physical 
invasion of the easement, the Appellants can only speculate they will receive less water in the 
future. Their hypothetical claim is clearly distinguishable from the facts in Schneider. 
Second, the Appellants' claimed future injury is not similar to the challenged ordinance 
in Boundary Backpackers. In that case the county enacted an ordinance purporting to require 
federal and state agencies to comply with the county's land use plan. 128 Idaho at 373-74. On 
appeal the county alleged the case was not ripe for judicial review. The Idaho Supreme Court 
disagreed noting the ordinance was in place, that it required the plan to be enforced, and that it 
threatened "the status and management of federal and state public lands" in the county. See id. at 
376. 
Where the county's law created an immediate and concrete problem for land managers in 
Boundary Backpackers, no such facts are shown here. Indeed, the Appellants can point to no 
actual harm or "definite and concrete" controversy. The District is not depriving or threatening 
to deprive the Appellants of any water, now or in the future. Just the opposite, the 
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implementation of the Plant #2 Project is increasing the instantaneous delivery of water to the 
Appellants during the irrigation season. R. 68. The delivery of water to other landowners within 
the District can be accomplished without taking any water away from the Appellants. R. 68. 
Without a case or controversy the District Court properly dismissed the Appellants' case 
for lack of standing. Just because the Appellants may disagree with the management of the 
irrigation district does not mean a justiciable controversy exists. See ABC Agra, LLC, 156 Idaho 
at 784 ("In order for there to be a justiciable controversy there must be more than a difference or 
dispute of a hypothetical or abstract character"). Consequently, the District Court rightly 
dismissed Count I as a matter oflaw. The Respondent respectfully requests this Court to affirm. 
B. Count III was properly dismissed. 
Similar to Count I, the District Court correctly dismissed Count III as a matter of law. 
The court succinctly held: 
R. 622. 
The [Appellants] have presented no facts that they are not receiving the amount of 
water they are entitled to nor have they presented any evidence, other than 
speculation, that their right to water is being or will be diluted. There are no facts 
alleged in the complaint nor any evidence submitted to establish the requisite 
requirement of threatened or immediate harm to justify any injunctive relief. 
Further, there are no facts alleged to support a claim that the District has breached 
any fiduciary duty at the present time. 
The Appellants argue that Respondent's fiduciary duties include a "duty not to reduce the 
amount of water available for Landowners' future use without their consent." App. Br. at 32. 
They further allege that the "amount of surface water for A&B 's use is fixed ... and A&B has 
increased the acreage on which this fixed supply will be applied-diluting the limited supply of 
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water and decreasing the supply available to Landowners without their consent."20 Id. Again, 
the Appellants' arguments are misplaced and based upon flawed premises. Further, pursuant to 
the criteria under Idaho trust law, Appellants have no case. 
To establish a claim for breach of a fiduciary duty, Appeiiants had to estabiish that the 
District owed a duty and that it was breached. See Sorensen v. Saint Alphonsus Reg'/ Med. Ctr., 
Inc., 141 Idaho 754, 760 (2005) (quoting Tolley v. THI Co., 140 Idaho 253,261 (2004); Country 
Cove Dev., Inc. v. May, 143 Idaho 595,601 (2006). However, the Appellants had to first 
establish standing before moving to the trust claim analysis. An allegation of speculative harm 
or injury "is not sufficient to confer standing." Coalition for Agri. 's Future, 160 Idaho at 148. 
First, the Appellants do not "own" the molecules of water diverted and stored under the 
District's storage water rights without regard to beneficial use or other District landowners. See 
Washington County Irr. Dist. v. Ta/boy, 55 Idaho 382,389 (1935); A&B Irr. Dist. v. State of 
Idaho, 157 Idaho 385,389 (2014). The District acquired storage water rights in American Falls 
(46,826 acre-feet) and Palisades (90,800 acre-feet) Reservoirs from the U.S. Bureau of 
Reclamation for the benefit of all landowners in the project. R. 63, 75. All District landowners, 
not just the Appellants, contribute to the repayment of the Reclamation contract and the annual 
operation and maintenance assessments levied against the storage space. R. 63-64. 
20 Idaho's water right transfer statute expressly acknowledges that using storage on more acres does not necessarily 
constitute a prohibited "enlargement" of the storage water right. See LC.§ 42-222(1) ("The transfer of the right to 
the use of stored water for irrigation purposes shall not constitute an enlargement in use of the original right even 
though more acres may be irrigated, ifno other water rights are injured thereby"). The Director confirmed this as 
well in an order involving the Respondent. R. 168 ("Storage water can be transferred in the State ofldaho and the 
place of use expanded without it being deemed an enlargement of use"). The same principle applies here. The 
Appellants claim the District is "diluting" or enlarging the water right, but they can show no injury. 
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Importantly, the District's storage water rights are appurtenant to and can be used on any 
lands within the irrigation district boundary. R. 63, 157-162 (stipulated storage water right 
decrees), 168.21 Indeed, all of the District's surface and groundwater rights are appurtenant to 
the entire project as defined in the water rights' place of use ur ''digitai boundary" under Idaho 
law. R. 150,474 (describing same "Large POU info" and referencing the District's digital 
boundary); see also, LC.§§ 42-219; 42-1411(2)(h). The elements of the District's storage water 
rights and prior orders from the Director of IDWR confirm the same. R. 164-182. The District 
Court specifically recognized "the Department of Water Resources has determined that 
'[S]torage water has always been viewed as a source of water that can be flexibly applied within 
an irrigation district's boundaries."'). R. 621-22. 
The development of the Plant #2 infrastructure allows the District to deliver available 
surface water to lands where ground water supplies are failing. The efficient and effective use of 
the District's water supplies benefits all landowners and complies with this Court's directive in 
A&B Irr. Dist., 153 Idaho 500 ("we find that the Director did not act arbitrarily or violate Idaho 
law when he found that A&B must work to reasonably interconnect some individual wells or 
well systems before a delivery call can be filed, and we affirm the district court's finding in this 
regard."). 22 
21 The referenced storage water rights for American Falls Reservoir (water right no. 1-2064) and Palisades Reservoir 
(water right no. 1-2068) were partially decreed by the SRBA District Court on August 17, 2016. This Court can 
take judicial notice of those final judgments as a matter of law. I.RE. 201(b); Trautman v. Hill, 116 Idaho 337,340 
(0. App. 1989). 
22 The Court analyzed CM Rule 42.g which provides: "The extent to which the requirements of the holder of a 
senior-priority water right could be met with the user's existing facilities and water supplies by employing 
reasonable diversion and conveyance efficiency and conservation practices; provided, however, the holder of a 
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Further, the wells on these lands remain in place and can be used in the event 
groundwater levels recover. The District has the ability to deliver groundwater if needed, 
including during times of surface water shortage. R. 65 ("the lands presently irrigated with 
groundwater are k:.11own as 'soft conversions' and may be irrigated with groundwater as 
necessary going forward"); see also, Tr. p. 63, L. 8-15. 
While the Appellants imply that the surface water delivered through the Plant #2 Project 
is "theirs alone," that is not the case. See App. Br. at 16 (claiming the water "otherwise would 
accrue on Landowners' behalf'). Indeed, Appellants cannot reasonably claim the District should 
"hoard" water for just their or certain other landowners' benefit without taking into account the 
balance of the irrigation district. See e.g. A&B Irr. Dist., 155 Idaho at 650 ("The concept that 
beneficial use acts as a measure and limit upon the extent of a water right is a consistent theme in 
Idaho water law."); AFRD #2, 143 Idaho at 880 ("the Court foresaw abuses that could occur 
when one is allowed to carryover water despite detriment to others. Concurrent with the right to 
use water in Idaho 'first in time,' is the obligation to put that water to beneficial use. To permit 
excessive carryover of stored water without regard to the need for it, would be in itself 
unconstitutional."). The District Court expressly recognized this rule as well. R. 622 ("The 
[Appellants] at oral argument asserted that the Project would dilute the amount of 'their' carry 
over water. An individual water user in an irrigation district does not have the right to carry over 
surface water storage right shall be entitled to maintain a reasonable amount of carry-over storage to assure water 
supplies in future dry years."). 153 Idaho at 514-16. 
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water. The reasonable amount of carryover of storage is between the District and the Director of 
the Idaho Department of Water Resources."). 
Based upon storage carryover and water supply conditions in the spring of 2016, A&B's 
manager expected the District's storage space to completely fill that year. R. 67. In other words, 
the supply was not "limited" or "fixed" in any way to the detriment of the Appellants. With 
approximately 137,000 acre-feet of storage when full, the District has the ability to deliver 
surface water to acres served by its canal system and the Plant #2 project in such years. R. 67-68 
("Based upon the District's carryover storage in Palisades, the present and continuing fill in 
American Falls storage, and the current water supply and snowpack conditions in the Upper 
Snake River Basin, I expect the District's storage supplies will completely fill this spring .... 
Delivering water to landowners served by the Plant #2 Project will not deprive or take away any 
water needed by the [Appellants] for irrigation this year."). 
Given these water supply conditions, even the case that Appellants rely upon counters 
their own claim in this regard. See Bradshaw v. Milner Low Lift Irr. Dist., 85 Idaho 528, 54 7 
(1963) ("we recognize the right acquired by the owners of the new lands, by their inclusion 
within the district, to the use of any water owned by the district when the use thereof is not 
required for the proper irrigation of the old lands, and when such use is not in conflict of the 
rights previously acquired by the owners of the old lands, or when such use is not in derogation 
or impairment of such rights.") (emphasis added). Stated another way, the District did not deny 
Appellants any water for the "proper irrigation" of their lands in 2016, therefore water deliveries 
through the Plant #2 Project did not conflict with or impair the Appellants' rights in any way. 
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Moreover, contrary to the Appellants' claims, it is speculative to argue that the District's 
storage water rights "will decrease" when they are capable of filling prior to the next irrigation 
season. While the water supply across Idaho varies year to year, some years, like the winter of 
20! 7, experience tremendous snowfall and precipitation events. In those situations, water is 
stored in the reservoirs and fills the space that was used for irrigation the prior year. 
Although the Appellants irrigate 610 acres, they do not dictate how water is delivered to 
the remaining 81,400 acres within the District. Stated another way, the Appellants cannot use 
their hypothetical future harm to prevent the delivery to other landowners in the District that 
need the water. Such a course of action would violate Idaho's water policy. See Idaho Ground 
Water Approp., Inc. v. IDWR, 160 Idaho 119, 131 (2016) ("As we recently stated in Clear 
Springs, the policy of securing the maximum use and benefit, and least wasteful use ofldaho's 
water resources, has long been the policy in Idaho"). 
The District Court acknowledged the same and found: 
The duties and responsibilities of the District are governed by Title 43, 
Chapter 3, as well as its by-laws, rules and regulations. The District has a duty 
fiduciary or otherwise to establish and provide for the "distribution and use of 
water among the owners" of the lands located within the boundaries of the 
District. There is no dispute that the defendant in this case has the authority to 
construct and improve irrigation works for the delivery of water to its landowners 
within the irrigation district. There is no dispute that the defendant is delivering 
water presently to its landowners, including the plaintiffs, and that the water is 
being distributed and used for agricultural purposes as contemplated in Article 
XV, Section 4 of the Idaho Constitution. The plaintiffs have not alleged that they 
have not received their allotted water. The plaintiffs only allege that the Project 
may in the future dilute or reduce the amount of water they are entitled to, 
including carry over water. 
* * * 
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The plaintiffs' claim is based on what may happen in the future in the event of a 
water shortage. The plaintiffs' seek to have this court enjoin the use of the 
Project, when in fact the Project is not presently causing or threatening any actual 
irreparable harm to the plaintiffs. The injury complained of by the plaintiffs is 
contingent upon the distribution of water in the event of a shortage and the 
priority of the water users within the District in the event of a water shortage. In 
other words any injury sustained or to be sustained by the plaintiffs stemming 
from their allegations of misconduct or any alleged breach are, at this point, 
hypothetical. The Court must find as a matter of law that the issues before the 
court do not present a real and substantial controversy that exists, and that there is 
no present need for adjudication. 
R. 619,623. 
Without a real or threatened injury, the District Court properly recognized there was no 
case or controversy concerning the Appellant's breach of fiduciary duty claim. Consequently, 
there was no reason to analyze whether any duty had been breached as required under Idaho trust 
law. Since the Appellants could show no actionable harm, they had no basis to pursue their 
claim in the first place. The Respondent respectfully requests this Court to affirm the District 
Court's dismissal of Count III accordingly. 
III. Since Appellants are Bound by the Prior Judgment, the District Court Properly 
Dismissed Count II as a Matter of Law. 
The District Court dismissed Count II on the basis that the Appellants could not 
collaterally attack the final judgment in Minidoka County Case No. CV-2014-189 and therefore 
the claim was barred by the doctrine of resjudicata. R. 384. The Appellants challenge this 
decision and argue that the prior judicial confirmation proceeding has no preclusive effect. See 
App. Br. at 40-41. In addition, the Appellants claim that the District's assessments to repay the 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 25 
Plant #2 loan are unconstitutional. See id. The Appellants' arguments are without merit and 
should be rejected as a matter of law. 23 
To briefly recap, the A&B Irrigation District held a special election in 2013 to authorize 
indebtedness for the Pla11t #2 Project. R. 3 7 l. The District foiiowed the specific and detaiied 
procedure required by Idaho law. See J.C. § 43-401 et seq. The election measure passed. R. 
371. Following the election, the District's Board of Directors noticed up and held the 
"apportionment hearing" pursuant to Idaho Code§ 43-405. R. 371, 187-88. Critically, the 
Appellants did not object to or oppose the Board's apportionment decision. R. 371. The Board 
apportioned the benefits and assessed the costs for the loan pro-rata across all acres assessed by 
the District. R. 66, 187-88. 
Thereafter, the District petitioned the Minidoka County District Court for judicial 
confirmation of the proceedings. R. 3 71. Despite their failure to appear before the Board, the 
Appellants24 appeared and filed a response in the judicial confirmation case, alleging that 
implementation of the District's Plant #2 Project and the assessment for the loan was 
23 The Appellants resort to hyperbole in an attempt to save their Count II claim. See App. Br. at 40 ("this case is a 
simple illustration of the tyranny of the majority ... to make Landowners, who are part of Unit A, pay for the 
Project that will divest them of their perpetual right to the water exclusively dedicated to their farms compounds the 
injury inflicted by A&B"). The Appellants' accusations grossly mischaracterize irrigation district law in Title 43, 
Idaho Code, and ignore the legal effect of loan elections and subsequent judicial confirmation proceedings. 
24 Appellants Daniel Paslay and Gary Ottman specifically appeared in the judicial confirmation case. R. 199. 
Although Ted Tateoka, a member and representative for Appellant Tateoka Brothers, LLC, appeared at the 
apportionment hearing, he did not oppose the Board's decision and did not appear in the judicial confirmation case. 
R. 66. Appellant Tateoka Brothers, LLC had the right to participate in the confirmation case, but chose not to do so. 
R. 381, n. 6 ("There is no dispute that due notice of that proceeding was provided as statutorily required"). 
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unconstitutional. R. 213-221. Coincidentally, the Appellants advanced the same arguments they 
are now making on the present appeal. Compare R. 217, 221 with App. Br. at 23, 31 . 
The Minidoka County District Court found that the District's election, apportionment of 
benefits, and proposed assessment of costs cornplied with Idaho iaw. R. 22 l -232, 271. While 
the court stated the Appellants' constitutional argument was beyond the scope of the case, it was 
still raised as a challenge to the Respondent's actions. R. 213-221. Critically, the Appellants did 
not appeal the court's final judgment. R. 371. The District Court in this case specifically 
addressed this fact and explained how the Appellants failed to pursue their judicial remedies on 
that issue: 
THE COURT: Well, res judicata applies to any claim that was raised or 
could have been raised. You attempted to raise it before Judge Crabtree, Judge 
Crabtree ruled against you. That's not to say Judge Crabtree was right or wrong. 
Why isn't that a decision on the merit of your claim? You could have appealed it 
to a higher court. If the other court had said- if the final court had said, "Yeah, 
this isn't appropriate in this proceeding to be raised. It's a moot point," then 
maybe that res judicata wouldn't apply, but you had another avenue that you 
didn't take. 
Tr., p. 46, L. 25 - p. 47, L. 11 (May 9, 2016 hearing). 
Based upon the above facts, and relying upon this Court's precedent, the District Court 
held that the final judgment was not subject to collateral attack and that the Appellants' Count II 
claim was barred by the doctrine of res judicata. R. 383-84. The Appellants contest the court's 
decision on two grounds: 1) the court erred in taking judicial notice of the Minidoka County 
case; and 2) the assessment violates their constitutional rights. See App. Br. at 28, 30-31. Both 
arguments fail and should be rejected. 
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First, the Appellants assert that the court was precluded from taking judicial notice of the 
prior case when analyzing the case under Rule 12(b ). See id. at 28. The Appellants rely upon 
Hellickson v. Jenkins, 118 Idaho 273 (Ct. App. 1990) to support their theory.25 However, that 
case is distinguishable and did not preclude the District Court from dismissing Count II under the 
summary judgment standard. See I.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) and 56. 
In Hellickson, the Idaho Court of Appeals found the magistrate judge erred when he took 
judicial notice of matters outside the pleadings, failed to inform the parties of the same, and then 
failed to convert the motion to one for summary judgment. 118 Idaho at 276. The Court of 
Appeals advised "if a court considers matters outside the pleadings on the Rule 12(b )( 6) motion 
to dismiss, such motion must be treated as a motion for summary judgment and the proceedings 
thereafter must comport with the hearing and notice requirements of Rule 56." Id. (emphasis in 
original). In other words, a trial court can take judicial notice and consider matters outside the 
pleadings provided the Rule 56 procedure is followed. See I.R.C.P. I2(d). 
Here the District Court properly recognized the summary judgment standard applied 
since materials outside the pleadings were submitted in support of the District's motion to 
dismiss. R. 373. Further, unlike the facts in Hellickson, here the District Court specifically 
addressed the proper standard to apply: 
25 The cases of Taylor v. McNichols, 149 Idaho 826 (2010), and Peterson v. Private Wilderness, LLC, 152 Idaho 691 
(2012) simply reaffirm the rule in Hellickson. Both cases acknowledge that a court can take judicial notice and 
consider materials outside the pleadings by converting a Rule 12(b)(6) motion into a summary judgment motion. 
Indeed, in Peterson, the Idaho Supreme Court took judicial notice of the prior case and granted summary judgment 
in favor of the appellant. 152 Idaho at 697 ("Accordingly, upon review of the record, this Court finds that the 
Petersons are entitled to summary judgment based upon judicial notice of the Easement Case."). 
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R. 375. 
Where a party files a motion to dismiss pursuant to I.R.C.P. I2(b)(6) and 
supports the motion with affidavits or other facts outside the pleadings and the 
court considers such matters outside the pleadings such a motion must be 
considered as a motion for summary judgment. Treating the motion as one for 
summary judgment is not error so long as the hearing and notice requirements of 
I.R.C.P. 56(c) are complied with. 
It is undisputed that the Respondent filed its motion and notice of hearing in compliance 
with the Rule 56(b) procedures. R. 38, 243. The motion was filed thirty-five (35) days before 
the scheduled hearing (May 9, 2016), a week longer than the required twenty-eight (28) days. 
See I.R.C.P. 56(b)(2). Accordingly, the Appellants can point to no error in the summary 
judgment process employed by the District Court. 26 
Next, through a strained reading of this Court's decision in Bradshaw, 85 Idaho 528, the 
Appellants allege that the District's assessment violates that decision and Art. I,§ 13 of the Idaho 
Constitution. See App. Br. at 30. Contrary to Appellants' theory, the District's assessment for 
the approved loan does not violate their constitutional rights or this Court's precedent. 27 The 
District Court rightly rejected these arguments. 
First, the Bradshaw case does not stand for the proposition that an assessment properly 
levied under Title 43, Idaho Code, is unconstitutional. As properly acknowledged by the District 
Court, Bradshaw concerned the annexation of "new" lands to an existing irrigation district and 
26 The Appellants also submitted materials from the Minidoka County judicial confirmation case for the District 
Court's review and consideration. R. 441-42 (affidavit of Rob Harris describing attached exhibits filed in the prior 
judicial confirmation case). 
27 In this regard, the Appellants' argument is no different than a citizen claiming a successful school bond levy is 
unconstitutional because he or she has no children attending the school. 
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the costs associated with that infrastructure and the new water supply for those lands. R. 379, 
383. In Bradshaw the "new" landowners agreed to pay for all those costs as a pre-condition to 
their annexation. 85 Idaho at 54 7-48. 
Here, on the othei hand, there is no annexation question to address and the District Court 
recognized that Bradshaw "does not apply to irrigation district lands which have established 
water rights appurtenant to such lands." R. 383. The District lands served by the Plant #2 
Project have been included in the irrigation district since its inception. Moreover, the delivery of 
surface water to lands through the Plant #2 Project does not involve any "annexation." Further, 
the District's natural flow and storage water rights already cover the lands under the water rights' 
decreedplaceofuse. R. 150-55, 157-62, 168. 
Contrary to the Appellants' claim, the Bradshaw Court's statement about the 
unconstitutionality of imposing such costs on the owners of the "old" lands is inapplicable both 
to that case and the present appeal. 28 See App. Br. at 30. Regardless, the District is not taking 
28 The Court's statement is dicta and a careful review of the three cited Idaho cases reveals that it did not create a 
new substantive constitutional cause of action. For instance, the Supreme Court in Bennett v. Twin Falls North Side 
Land & Water Co., 27 Idaho 643, 150 P. 336 (1915) simply found that water rights could not be taken without due 
process and just compensation. 150 P.3d at 339. Nothing in that decision addressed properly levied assessments by 
an irrigation district or held that Art. I,§§ 13 and 14 of the Idaho Constitution was implicated in any way. Next, 
Nampa & Meridian Irr. Dist. v. Briggs, 27 Idaho 84, 147 P. 75 (1915) did not address Art. I,§§ 13 and 14 of the 
Idaho Constitution either. In that case the Court confirmed that the irrigation district acquired its interest in the 
former canal company subject to existing contracts, including the respondent's separate right to water and the prior 
contracted operation and maintenance assessment. 14 7 P. at 82-83. The case did not involve the question of an 
assessment levied to pay for a loan authorized and properly incurred pursuant to I.C. § 43-401 et seq. In other 
words, unlike the respondent in Briggs, the Appellants here do not have a separate water right or contract they 
acquired prior to the formation of the A&B Irrigation District. Finally, Knowles v. New Sweden Irr. Dist., 16 Idaho 
217, 101 P. 81 (1908) does not support Appellants' argument. Like Briggs, that case involved a landowner who 
owned water rights and privileges separate from the district at the time of the irrigation district's organization. 101 
P. at 84. In other words the appellant was not like the other landowners in the district. Regardless, Knowles has 
since been overruled by this Court. See Moon v. North Idaho Farmers Ass 'n, 140 Idaho 536, 542 (2004) ("This 
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the Appellants' property (i.e. "their money") through annual assessments without due process. 
There is no question the Appellants were provided "due process", both before the Board and the 
Minidoka County District Court. That is the very reason for the statutory apportionment and 
confirmation process. In other ,vords, the i\ppellants \Vere provided "due process" at three 
separate stages (election, board, court). The fact Appellants failed to exercise their rights before 
the Board and the fact they did not prevail in the judicial confirmation case does not mean the 
District has violated their constitutional rights. The District Court properly dismissed Count II, 
and the Appellants have not shown any error in that decision. 
Finally, the Appellants' argument ignores the plain language of Idaho Code§ 43-405 and 
the legal effect of their failure to appear before the Board at the apportionment hearing: 
Any person interested who shall fail to appear before the board shall not be 
permitted thereafter to contest said assessment or any part thereof except upon 
special application to the court in the proceedings for confirmation of said 
assessment, showing reasonable excuse for failing to appear before said board of 
directors. 
LC. § 43-405 ( emphasis added). 
The statute's requirements provide certainty to irrigation districts that undertake such 
indebtedness, hold the apportionment hearing, and have it judicially confirmed. Indeed, if a 
disgruntled landowner could choose not to participate and then file a separate declaratory 
judgment action years later to challenge the assessment, what would be the point of the detailed 
statutory process? Certainly that is not the result the Legislature intended in enacting Chapter 4, 
Idaho authority [Knowles] relied upon by the district court has since been overruled by the Supreme Court's 
interpretation of the scope of a taking."). 
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Title 43, Idaho Code. Since the Appellants failed to appear and object before the Board, they are 
absolutely prohibited from challenging the District's "assessment or any part thereof." LC. § 43-
405. Consequently, the Appellants' Count II claim is precluded as a matter of law. 
Further, there is no constitutional violation resulti.1g from the District's law~ful 
assessment. Notably, the Appellants all voluntarily paid the 2016 assessment levied by the 
District. R. 345. As such, the District did not "take" any property from them. The Appellants 
allege they cannot be "deprived of ... property without due process of law," yet they ignore the 
Board's apportionment process, the judicial confirmation proceeding, and their voluntary 
payment of the assessment. It is undisputed that the District followed the statutory process and 
provided the required notice for the apportionment hearing and the judicial confirmation 
proceeding. R. 229, LC. § 43-407. 
Finally, the Idaho Supreme Court has expressly held that the statutory process does not 
violate the constitution. See American Falls Res. Dist. v. Thrall, 39 Idaho 130, 145 (1924) ("All 
this was a proper subject of inquiry for the board, and the apportionment was made after notice 
had been given of the time and place of this hearing. Notice of the confirmation proceedings was 
given, and the owners of all land assessed were entitled to appear before the court in this 
proceeding, in which the court was authorized to correct all errors in the assessment, 
apportionment and distribution of costs. This constitutes due process of law and is not a taking 
of property without compensation.") ( emphasis added). The District Court properly relied upon 
this precedent in dismissing Appellants' claim. R. 383. 
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Since the Appellants failed to follow the statutory process and did not object to the 
Board's decision, they have no legal basis to contest the assessment now. As held by the Idaho 
Supreme Court in Thrall, the procedures are constitutional and the assessments do not result in a 
taking of the .A .. ppellants' property .. The Respondent respectfully requests the Court to affirm the 
District Court's dismissal of Count II accordingly. 
IV. The District Court Properly Exercised its Discretion in Denying Appellants' 
Motions to Strike and Continue the Proceedings. 
A. Appellants' Motions to Strike Were Properly Denied. 
The Appellants moved to strike the affidavits of A&B's manager Dan Temple. R. 263, 
491. In an exercise of discretion, the District Court denied the Appellants' motions. R. 375, 
614. On appeal, the Appellants do not dispute the substance of the Temple Affidavits but instead 
allege the District Court's decision on the issue is "unclear" and contrary to Rule l 2(b) 
procedure.29 See App. Br. at 20. 
The admissibility of evidence and the decision to grant or deny a motion to strike are 
matters of discretion with the trial court. See I.R.C.P. 12(f); Shea, 156 Idaho at 544. A trial 
court has broad discretion in the admission of evidence and its judgment will only be reversed 
when there has been a clear abuse of discretion. See Baker, 117 Idaho at 698. A trial court does 
not abuse its discretion if it: (I) correctly perceives the issue as discretionary; (2) acts within the 
29 The Respondent provided substantive reasons for the foundation and basis for the Temple affidavits and attached 
exhibits. Although the Appellants do not challenge the District Court's decision on those grounds, the Respondent's 
prior analysis is incorporated herein by reference. R. 327-331. 
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bounds of discretion and applies the correct legal standards; and (3) reaches the decision through 
an exercise of reason. See Jenkins, 141 Idaho at 239. 
The Appellants can point to no "clear abuse of discretion" by the District Court in 
denying their motions to strike. Instead, they only aigue that it was "ui1clear whetl1er tl1e District 
Court perceived this issue as one of discretion" and it was their theory the court "intended to 
evaluate [Appellants'] claims under Rule 12(b)(6)." App. Br. at 20. Stated another way, the 
Appellants believed the Court did not consider the Temple Affidavits because it explained they 
"were not essential or necessary." Id. Contrary to the Appellants' claim, the Court found Mr. 
Temple's testimony and exhibits to be "relevant to the allegations of the [Appellants] complaint 
and that the foundational showing is sufficient." R. 375. As such, the information was properly 
considered and reviewed. The Appellants even admit that information from the Temple 
Affidavits was set forth in the Court's decisions. See App. Br. at 21. 
Although the District Court stated the affidavits were not "essential" or "necessary," that 
statement did not change the Court's review or the fact that it properly considered the motions to 
dismiss under the Rule 56 summary judgment procedure. R. 373,614. Indeed, there is no doubt 
the District Court followed the Rule 56 timeframe as it did not consider the Respondent's reply 
brief in support of the motion to dismiss. R. 614 ("The Court will not consider the reply brief as 
it was not filed timely. I.R.C.P. 56(c)"). 
In sum, the District Court properly exercised its discretion and denied the Appellants' 
motions to strike. Since the Appellants cannot show any "clear abuse of discretion," the District 
Court's rulings should be affirmed. 
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B. Appellants' Motions to Continue Were Properly Denied. 
Similar to the motions to strike, the District Court's denial of the Appellants' motions to 
continue is reviewed pursuant to an abuse of discretion standard. See Taylor v. AJA Servs. Corp., 
151 Idaho 552,572 (2011). The Appellants vaguely argue that the District Court "did not 
exercise reason or apply the correct standards in reaching its conclusion." See App. Br. at 33. 
The Appellants also wrongly allege the court "did not even attempt to cite, address, analyze, or 
otherwise even acknowledge the affidavits submitted" with their motions. Id. at 35. To the 
contrary, the court recognized the applicable rule and identified the deficiencies in the affidavit 
of the Appellants' counsel. R. 374-75; Tr. p. 9, Ln. 17 - p. I 0, Ln. 4 (May 9, 2016 hearing). 
First, the District Court exercised its discretion and denied the Appellants' motion to 
continue the proceedings under Rule 56(±). 30 The court rightly found that the Appellants did not 
make a "showing that they are unable to present specific facts to support their opposition to the 
motion. They merely assert that they should be entitled to discovery before the motion is heard 
by the Court." R. 374. Further, the court acknowledged that since there were no facts in dispute 
there was no basis to continue the hearing on the District's motion. See id. The Appellants have 
failed to show a "clear abuse of discretion" in this decision and therefore it should be affirmed. 
Notably, the Appellants fail to recognize the key undisputed facts central to the Court's 
analysis: 1) that they were not deprived of any water or "property rights"; and 2) the assessment 
for the Plant #2 Project loan was judicially confirmed by the Minidoka County District Court. R. 
30 The reference is to Rule 56 as it existed prior to the rule's amendment effective July 1, 2016. The issue formerly 
addressed in Rule 56(f) is now covered under Rule 56(d). 
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374. Given these facts the Court properly exercised its discretion and refused to grant the 
motions to continue for unnecessary and non-essential discovery. 
The Appellants argue that the affidavits of counsel provided the basis for the continuance 
and ,x1hat they expected to receive in discovciy that would have assisted h1 opposh1g the 
District's motions. However, the Appellants do not deny they were able to file briefs and other 
materials in opposition to the motions to dismiss. R. 263-279, 281-300, 491-520. In other 
words, contrary to Rule 56(t)'s requirement, the Appellants did not show anything missing that 
was "essential" to justify their opposition. 
The purpose of Rule 56(±) is to ensure that the non-moving party has adequate time to 
conduct necessary discovery. See Boise Mode, LLC v. Donahoe Pace & Partners LTD, 154 
Idaho 99, 105 (2013). However, in an exercise of discretion, the District Court properly found 
that additional discovery in the instant case was not necessary or warranted. When seeking a 
continuance under Rule 56(±), the moving party "must 'do so in good faith by affirmatively 
demonstrating why he cannot respond to a movant' s affidavits ... and how postponement of a 
ruling on the motion will enable him, by discovery or other means, to rebut the movant' s 
showing of the absence of a genuine issue of fact."' Jenkins v. Boise Cascade Corp., 141 Idaho 
233,239 (2005) (emphasis added) (quoting Allen v. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 81 F.3d 793, 
797 (8th Cir. 1996)). 
In Jenkins, the Court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the 
motion because "the affidavit ... did not specify what discovery was needed" to properly 
respond to the summary judgment motion, "and did not set forth how the evidence he expected 
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to gather through further discovery would be relevant to preclude summary judgment." Id. at 
239. The same reasoning applies to the facts in this case as the Appellants have failed to show 
any error in the District Court's analysis. Moreover, the Appellants carried the "the burden of 
setting out '\vhat further discover; vvould reveal that is essential to justify their opposition,' 
making clear 'what information is sought and how it would preclude summary judgment."' Id. 
( quoting Nicholas v. Wallenstein, 266 F .3d 1083, 1088-89 (9th Cir. 2001 )). The Appellants did 
not meet this burden. 
Finally, the Appellants' current argument on appeal contradicts their prior position on 
this issue. See App. Br. at 8, 46 (admitting the record is sufficient for summary judgment). 
Notably, the Appellants now claim "that the record is sufficiently developed (despite the lack of 
discovery) ... that this Court can reverse the District Court and grant summary judgment in 
[Appellants'] favor." 31 App. Br. at 46. This new position is an about-face from the one they 
advanced before the District Court where they only asked the court to deny the Respondent's 
motions to dismiss. R. 278-79, 520. If the record is "sufficiently developed" for purposes of 
summary judgment, which the Respondent does not dispute, then it is obvious the District Court 
properly denied the Appellants' motions for continuance. Stated another way, there is nothing 
missing in the record that would justify a continuance to not hear the District's motions to 
dismiss. The District Court properly exercised its discretion in this regard. 
31 Notwithstanding the argument, the Appellants' requested relief is no longer available under Idaho's civil rules. 
Although former Rule 56(b) authorized judgment for the non-moving party, the rule was amended by this Court in 
2016 and that provision was deleted. 
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In sum, the Appellants' requested continuance to conduct unnecessary and costly 
discovery was properly denied. The District Court properly exercised its discretion and 
recognized the key underlying facts were not in dispute. As such, the Appellants failed to show 
\vhat additional discovery was necessary to justify their opposition to the District's motions to 
dismiss. The Respondent respectfully requests this Court to affirm. 
V. The Appellants Present No Argument in Support of Issue G. 
In the "Statement oflssues" Appellants identify "G. Whether the District Court erred in 
denying Plaintifjs 'Motion for Reconsideration." See App. Br. at 6. Despite the stated issue the 
Appellants provide no argument or authority in support in their opening brief. 
The District Court denied the Appellants' motion for reconsideration below. R. 624. On 
appeal, the Appellants have failed to present any argument to show the court erred. Since there 
is nothing for this Court to review on this issue, the Appellants have waived it and the Court 
should deny the issue accordingly. See I.A.R. 35(a)(6); Shea, 156 Idaho at 548; Jorgensen v. 
Coppedge, 145 Idaho 524, 528 (2008) (Court will not consider an issue not "supported by 
argument and authority in the opening brief''). 
VI. The Court Should Award Respondent's Attorneys' Fees on Appeal. 
The District Court properly granted the Respondent's motions to dismiss based upon 
clear and well-established precedent. The Appellants ignore the case law and governing statutes 
and continue to make the same exact arguments they made before the District Court. Compare 
App. Br. at 9-45 with R. 263-279, 281-300, 491-520. The Appellants even filed a 45-page 
motion for reconsideration, which took considerable time and effort to address, despite the 
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unmeritorious positions. R. 393-437. The Appellants' decision to appeal this matter is 
unreasonable given the District Court's well-reasoned and careful decisions. As such, the 
Respondent's attorneys' fees should be awarded on appeal. See I.A.R. 41(a). 
Idaho Code§ 12-117(1) provides for an award of fees to the prevailing party when a case 
involves a "political subdivision"32 - such as the Respondent - and where the "nonprevailing 
party acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law." In Rangen, Inc. v. JDWR, 159 Idaho 798 
(2016), this Court addressed the reasonableness standard of section 42-117(1) as follows: 
In an appeal where the prevailing party sought attorney fees under section 12-
117, the Court granted fees where the nonprevailing party 
continued to rely on the same arguments used in front of the district 
court, without providing any additional persuasive law or bringing into 
doubt the existing law on which the district court based its decision. 
Although the [ non prevailing parties] may have had a good faith basis to 
bring the original suit based on their interpretation of Idaho law, [they] 
were very clearly aware of the statutory procedures, failed to appeal 
separate appraisals when they had a right to appeal, and were clearly 
advised on the applicable law in an articulate and well reasoned written 
decision from the district court. Nevertheless, [they] chose to further 
appeal that decision to this Court, even though they failed to add any 
new analysis or authority to the issues raised below. Accordingly, it was 
frivolous and unreasonable to make a continued argument, and [the 
prevailing party] is awarded its reasonable attorney fees. 
159 Idaho at 807 (emphasis added). 
In Ran gen, the Idaho Department of Water Resources prevailed on appeal. There, Rangen 
had challenged decisions before the Department (through a petition for reconsideration before the 
32 The Idaho Supreme Court determined that a "taxing district" in the definition of "political subdivision" in Idaho 
Code § 12-117(4)(b) includes an "irrigation district." See Bettwieser v. New York Irr. Dist., 154 Idaho 317, 329 
(2013); see also, Peiper v. Aberdeen-Springfield Canal Co., 133 Idaho 82, 92 (1999). 
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Director), before the District Court (through a petition for judicial review of the Director's decision) 
and before this Court on appeal. See 159 Idaho at 798. Rangen did not prevail in any of those 
challenges. See id. In granting the Department's request for fees, this Court determined: "Rangen 
asserted substantially the same arguments on appeal as it did before the district court on judiciai 
review and failed to add significant new analysis or authority to support its arguments." Id. at 807. 
The same analysis applies here and warrants an award of attorneys' fees. Indeed, a review 
of the briefing shows that the Appellants have advanced the same unpersuasive arguments. The 
Appellants have not added any "significant new analysis or authority to support its arguments" -
rather, they rely upon the same cases and arguments as in the briefing to the District Court. The 
Appellants have failed to show how the District Court erred in its decisions. Since the Appellants 
have not advanced any new arguments or analysis, the Court should award the Respondent's 
attorneys' fees on appeal under Idaho Code§ 12-117. 
In addition, section 12-121 further provides the judiciary with discretion to "award 
reasonable attorney's fees to the prevailing party or parties" when 'justice so requires."33 See I.C. § 
12-121; Hoffer v. Shappard, l 60 Idaho 868, 883 (2016) ( Court stating this new rule of law is 
effective March 1, 2017). Here, the Appellants are requesting this Court to improperly "second-
33 Based on a 2013 case it appeared the Idaho Supreme Court only allowed irrigation districts to seek attorneys' fees 
in cases they were involved in under Idaho Code§ 12-117. See Bettwieser, 154 Idaho at 329 ("As explained, in 
cases where§ 12-117 applies, that section is the exclusive authority for awarding attorney fees"). However, 
although it appears that Bettwieser has not been expressly overruled, the Supreme Court has since held that Idaho 
Code § 12-117 is not the exclusive statute for seeking attorneys' fees when a case involves a political subdivision 
like an irrigation district. See Syringa Networks, LLC v. Idaho Dept. of Admin., 155 Idaho 55, 67 (2013); Sanders v. 
Board of Trustees of Mountain Home Sch. Dist. No. 193, 156 Idaho 269,272 (2014); State v. Grathol, 158 Idaho 39, 
51 (2015) ("Thus, we no longer hold that section 12-117 is the exclusive basis for state agencies to seek attorneys 
fees"). 
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guess" the District Court and its well-reasoned analysis. Again, the Court recently rebuked such an 
attempt in Frantz v. Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley, LLP, 161 Idaho 60, 383 P.3d 1230 (2016) and 
found that attorneys fees were warranted under section 12-121. In Frantz, the Court noted: 
Section 12-121 allows an award of attorney fees to a prevaiiing party where "the 
action was pursued, defended, or brought frivolously, unreasonably, or without 
foundation." Idaho Military Historical Soc '.Y v. Mas/em, 156 Idaho 624, 633, 329 
P .3d 1072, I 081 (2014 ). "Such circumstances exist when an appellant has only 
asked the appellate court to second-guess the trial court by reweighing the evidence 
or has failed to show that the district court incorrectly applied well-established law." 
Snider v. Arnold, 153 Idaho 641, 645-646, 289 P.3d 43, 47-48 (2012). Further 
attorney fees on appeal have been awarded under Section 12-121 when appellants 
"'failed to add any new analysis or authority to the issues raised below' that were 
resolved by the district court's well-reasoned authority." Wagner v. Wagner, 160 
Idaho 294,302,371 P.3d 807,815 (2016) (quoting Castrigno v. McQuade, 141 
Idaho 93, 98, 106 P.3d 419,424 (2005)). 
383 P.3d at 1236. 
Like the appellant in Frantz, the Appellants here have failed to show that the District Court 
incorrectly applied well-established law. Further, the Appellants have not added "any new analysis 
or authority" to issues that were raised before the District Court and resolved by its well-reasoned 
authority. Under these circumstances 'justice so requires" an award of fees to the Respondent 
under section 12-121. See Hoffer, 160 Idaho at 883. 
In sum, the Appellants' appeal is unreasonable and without a legal foundation. The District 
Court applied well-established law and analysis in its decision. The Respondent respectfully 
requests the Court to enter an order awarding its attorneys' fees under either sections 12-117 or 121. 
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CONCLUSION 
The A&B Irrigation District Plant #2 Project was properly approved and is being used to 
efficiently and effectively deliver irrigation water to its landowners consistent with Idaho law. 
The project also increased the Appellants' instantaneous waier deiivery rate during the peak of 
the irrigation season from 0.75 to 1 miner's inch/acre. This 33% increase in water delivery 
during the peak of the irrigation season will benefit their agricultural operations. Next, the 
District's loan for the project was properly approved through the statutory election and judicial 
confirmation process. Although the Appellants disagree with the Respondent's decision, they 
are bound by statute, the Minidoka County District Court's decision, and this Court's precedent. 
The District Court recognized these salient facts and properly dismissed the Appellants' 
case as a matter of law. Since the Appellants did not show a "distinct and palpable injury" they 
lacked standing to pursue the case. Moreover, the Respondent did not violate any constitutional 
rights or breach any fiduciary duties. 
The District Court's decisions are supported by law and should be affirmed. The 
Respondent respectfully requests this Court to affirm and award its reasonable attorneys' fees on 
appeal. 
DATED this 3rd day of March, 2017. 
BARKER ROSHOLT & SIMPSON LLP 
Travis L. Thompson 
Attorneys for Respondent A&B Irrigation District 
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